Introduction
Indexicals are normally defined as expressions whose reference is fixed by the context of speech. But the latter notion, I will argue (following (Banfield, 1982) and (Doron, 1991) ), should be ramified into a Context of Thought and a Context of Utterance. The Context of Thought is the point at which a thought originates; it includes a thinker, a time of thought and a world of thought (in some cases a thought might also have an intended addressee, especially if it corresponds to a speech act). The
Context of Utterance is the point at which the thought is expressed; it includes a speaker, a hearer, a time of utterance and a world of utterance 1 . The difference rarely matters in everyday life: a person's mouth is located near a person's brain, and as a result the point at which a thought is formed is not significantly different from that at which it is expressed. If we were very different creatures, we might be able to have our brain in one location and to express its thoughts in another. The distinction would then be much more useful, as it would allow us to distinguish, say, between a here of intention (denoting things near the point where the thought was formed) from a here of expression (denoting things near the point where the thought was expressed). Although this situation doesn't seem to arise in real life, there are two literary styles in which the narrator presents things as if the Context of Thought were significantly different from the Context of Utterance 2 : narrations in Free Indirect Discourse (='Represented Speech and Thought', in Banfield's terminology) and narrations in the * Thanks to Edit Doron, Paul Egré, Orin Percus, Barry Schein and Benjamin Spector for discussion of the some of the data. Special thanks to Ann Banfield, Edit Doron, Yael Sharvit and an anonymous reviewer for extremely useful comments and criticisms. A preliminary version of some ideas and examples discussed in the present article appear in French in (Schlenker, to appear b) 1 As A. Banfield observes, the terms 'context of utterance', 'speaker', 'hearer' and 'time of utterance' are too narrow, since a thought may be expressed in writing. Thus it should be understood that the 'context of utterance' denotes the point at which a thought is expressed, even if its expression does not involve spoken language.
Historical Present. In such cases natural language indexicals are seen to fall into two lexical categories, depending on the context with respect to which they are evaluated: (i) tenses 3 and pronouns depend on the Context of Utterance, while (ii) all other indexicals (including the demonstratives, as well as here, now, and yesterday) depend on the Context of Thought. The surprising fact, then, is that these literary styles provide evidence for a grammatical distinction that has essentially no import in day-to-day life but seems to be hard-wired in language. The challenge, of course, is to explain why pronouns and tenses form a natural class and behave so differently from other indexicals. I will suggest that pronouns and tenses differ from other indexicals in that they alone are variables, whose domains of reference are determined by the grammatical features they carry, for instance person, gender, or tense. These features serve as a system of classification whose referential is the utterance itself. By contrast, the denotation of other indexicals is fixed by the intentions of the thinker and thus by the Context of Thought which, in the literary styles under study, is distinct from the Context of Utterance.
As soon as a narrator is allowed to do as if things were different from what they are, either the Context of Thought q or the Context of Utterance u (or both) may be taken to be distinct from the physical point at which the narrator's words are expressed, what I will henceforth call the 'actual context', c.
-In Free Indirect Discourse, the Context of Utterance is the actual context, but the Context of
Thought is taken to be located somewhere else (thus c=u and q≠c). This creates the impression that, quite literally, another person's thoughts are articulated through the speaker's mouth, with interesting literary effects, as in (1):
(1) Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! (Lawrence, Women in Love, p. 185, London, Heinemann 1971; cited in (Banfield, 1982) p. 98 and (Doron, 1991)) In (1) the thought expressed is not attributed to the narrator but to one of his characters, as shown by the fact that the narrator could add without any air of contradiction: This turned out to be incorrect (the next day was in fact Sunday). The character's perspective serves as the Context of Thought, with respect to which the indexicals tomorrow and now are evaluated. Still, the past tense is evaluated with respect to the actual speech act, which serves as the Context of Utterance. If tomorrow and the past tense were evaluated with respect to the same context, the sentence would result in a contradiction, contrary to fact. As several other researchers (in particular (Banfield, 1982) and (Doron, 1991) ), I take this observation to establish decisively that sentences in Free Indirect
Discourse must be evaluated with respect to two contexts rather than one ( If fifty eight years ago and the present tense were evaluated with respect to the same context, (2) would result in a contradiction. But in fact this sentence is felicitous; from the present perspective, the explanation is simply that the time of the Context of Utterance u is set exactly fifty eight years before the time of the Context of Thought q, which yields the impression that the speaker is directly witnessing the relevant scene. (Although the past tense would be perfectly acceptable in this example, it would not produce the impression of vividness which is one of the hallmarks of the Historical Present, and which is in need of explanation; from the present perspective the vividness derives from the fact that the speaker presents himself as directly witnessing the events he is describing).
Thus our suggestion is that a simple distinction between Context of Thought and Context of Utterance permits a unified theory of Free Indirect Discourse and of the Historical Present, in which the latter emerges as the mirror image of the former. In fact, the attempt is to deduce some properties of the Historical Present from the analysis of Free Indirect Discourse. In particular, once it is observed that in Free Indirect Discourse the assertion is attributed to the Context of Thought, and
hence not to the actual speaker, we can predict that in the Historical Present the opposite pattern should be found, with the result that the assertion should in fact be attributed to the actual speaker.
Be that as it may, I largely agree in my conclusions with (Banfield, 1982) , who mostly discussed Free Indirect Discourse (with an interesting foray into the Historical Present on pp. 165-167). I will also borrow important insights from (Doron, 1991) , who framed her own theory within Situation Semantics. In this paper, by contrast, I develop the theory in an extensional variant of Kaplan's logic of demonstratives (the system is extensional in order to allow tenses to be treated as variables in exactly the same way that pronouns are; see the discussion below).
The difference between Context of Thought and Context of Utterance should be contrasted with other distinctions that have sometimes been drawn in the analysis of indexicals.
-As put it (citing Donnellan), if sound traveled very slowly our language could distinguish between a now of production and a now of audition (Kaplan, 1989 p. 491 fn 12) . The distinction is coherent, but it does not appear to be used in the grammar of natural language. It is, in any event, different from the distinction drawn here. The Context of Utterance could be further subdivided in the way suggested by Donnellan if one so wished (for instance there could be two present tenses, etc.).
-Our attempt should also be distinguished from theories that retain the unity of the notion of context, but argue for a revised analysis of what contexts are. assumes that only proper contexts, contexts that correspond to a possible speech act, should be admitted in the semantics. As a result, a sentence such as I am here now comes out as a logical truth, because for any proper context c the agent of c is located at the place of c at the time of c in the world of c. (Predelli, 1998) challenges this view, on the ground that such sentences are not logical truths -witness the fact that I am not here now may be felicitously uttered through the intermediary of an answering machine.
Predelli's solution is to extend the set of contexts to include improper ones, and thus to weaken the logic of indexicals. Crucially, his treatment does not require any modification of our grammatical analysis of indexicality: a single notion of context does all the work, although its semantics is not the standard one. By contrast, the present attempt is to show that any theory of indexicality must distinguish between two notions of context (as it turns out, at least one of these contexts must be allowed to be improper; see Section 3.2).
The rest of this note is organized as follows. The main properties of Free Indirect Discourse are summarized in Section 1, where I motivate the distinction between Context of Thought and
Context of Utterance. I follow relatively closely (Banfield, 1982) and (Doron, 1991) , but try to address the question why tense and person behave differently from other indexicals. A simple formal analysis of Free Indirect Discourse is then developed in Section 2. Finally, I show in Section 3 that the required machinery suffices to explain -indeed, to predict-some of the main properties of the Historical Present. Some consequences of the analysis for the theory of quotation are developed in the conclusion. (Reinhart, 1983) :
Properties of Free Indirect Discourse
(8) a. Oedipus believed that his mother wasn't his mother.
b. #His mother was not his mother, Oedipus believed.
In Free Indirect Discourse everything except pronouns and tenses is read De Dicto, i.e. from the character's perspective. As a result, both occurrences of his mother in the Free Indirect Discourse in (8)b are interpreted De Dicto, which attributes to the character a contradictory thought; no such 4 I have argued in ( Schlenker, 2003) and ( Schlenker, to appear, a) that the behavior displayed by tomorrow is not universal, and that some indexicals, such as dans deux jours (lit. 'in two days') in French or for some speakers two days ago in English can in fact be evaluated with respect to the context of a reported speech act when it appears in an indirect discourse such as (6)b. But this does not affect the present point, since it is only a very restricted class of indexicals that can display such a behavior. By contrast, every indexical except person and tense behaves like tomorrow in Free Indirect Discourse. (I do not attempt in this note to integrate the theory of indirect discourse developed in (Schlenker, 2003) with the analysis of Free Indirect Discourse.) effect holds in the standard Indirect Discourse in (8) In this as in other respects Free Indirect Discourse patterns with quotations rather than with standard indirect discourse. In fact it behaves like a quotation whose 'grammatical skeleton' (=the tenses and pronouns) had been modified to match the perspective of the narrator. In this sense our initial observation that 'someone else appears to be speaking through the narrator's mouth' is more than a mere metaphor. It offers a solution (to be fleshed out below) to the problem raised by the contrast between (9)a and (9)b below. If in each case the first sentence is unembedded, why is a. not
The solution is to analyze a. by analogy with the quasi-dialogue in c., in which the narrator comments on a character's utterance. As can be seen this does not entail that the utterance itself is syntactically embedded under an attitude operator (as is the case in d.):
(9) a. [In a novel:] Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! (As it turned out, this wasn't true. The following day was Sunday).
5 As A. Banfield (p.c.) observes, the words need not be attributed to the character in a completely literal fashion, since the following is certainly a coherent example of Free Indirect Discourse: (i) But of course he would do it, Jean said in French Clearly, what is attributed to Jean in this example is a French translation of the words used. Importantly, the same observation carries over to standard cases of quotation, which need not literally attribute the words quoted to the character, as illustrated in (ii):
(ii) 'But of course I will do it', Jean said in French.
Thus despite examples such as (i) it is true that in Free Indirect Discourse the words themselves must be attributed to the character 'as if they were quoted'.
b.
[In a non-fictional context:] Tomorrow is Monday, the beginning of another school week.
#This isn't true.
c. -Tomorrow is Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! (As it turned out, this wasn't true.)
d. John thought that the following day was Monday, the beginning of another school week. (As it turned out, this wasn't true.)
In sum, the analogy between Free Indirect Discourse and pieces of (quasi-)dialogue suggests that we may both claim that the thoughts expressed in a passage in Free Indirect Discourse are not attributed to the narrator, and yet that the passage is not syntactically embedded under an attitude operator. The key is to suggest that although the Context of Utterance remains constant throughout (9)a, the Context of Thought is not the same in the first sentence and in the second.
Why are tenses and pronouns special?
So far we have remained close to the spirit of (Banfield, 1982) and (Doron, 1991) . The question these authors do not address, however, is why tenses and pronouns should behave In the system developed below, sorted variables are lexically associated with a domain of reference. Whether free or bound, they receive their denotation from an assignment function, but
give rise to referential failure if their denotation does not lie in their designated domain. In this sense the sortal restrictions do not 'add' anything to the thought expressed by a sentence. They serve as a system of classification of the denotations with respect to a coordinate system, whose origin is, in effect, the Context of Utterance itself.
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Referential failure for pronouns is analyzed by (Cooper, 1983) in terms of presupposition. This is not exactly the treatment I adopt here, because presuppositions may normally be filtered out in certain semantic environments (for instance The King of France is happy yields a presupposition failure, while the following sentence doesn't: If France were a monarchy, the King of France would be happy). By contrast, the sortal requirements of pronouns appear to be absolute. See (Geurts, 1999) for a recent discussion.
Let us now consider in greater detail the respects in which tense and pronouns form a natural class. The three properties listed above are standardly taken to apply to he or she, which (i) may be left free (e.g. She left me, uttered without linguistic antecedent (Partee, 1973) ) or be bound (Every woman thinks she is the wisest) and (ii) may cause referential failure if the intended denotation does not satisfy its sortal restrictions (She is wise, talking about George W. Bush). In addition, (iii) the gender features of pronouns are sometimes pronounced but not interpreted, as is suggested by the following (Heim & Kratzer, 1998) : (10) For the inference to go through (...therefore Peter didn't do his homework), (10)a must be understood on the bound variable reading (='sloppy reading') represented in (10)b; and the bound variable her must range over non-female individuals -in particular, over Peter. But if the gender features of her were semantically interpreted this would give rise to a referential failure, since Peter isn't a woman.
The conclusion is that in this case the gender features of her are morphologically present but semantically invisible (we do not attempt to explain why this is so, but only to suggest that this is one of the characteristic properties of pronominal features).
All three properties appear to hold of first and second person pronouns as well. First, as noted in (Heim, 1991) , first and second person pronouns may sometimes be used as bound variables, as shown by the following example:
(11) a. I did my homework. Peter did too (on the reading: Peter did his homework too)
Standard syntactic assumptions suggest that a bound variable reading must be available in the first sentence in (11)a to license the bound (='sloppy') reading in the elided conjunct, as is represented in (11)b. As in the case of her in (10), it must also be stipulated that person features can be ignored in the course of ellipsis resolution, or else the second sentence of (11) denotations from an assignment function, and since they bear different indices they may refer to different people; however the feminine features that appear on the pronouns constrain their referential possibilities, yielding a referential failure if s(x k ) or s(x m ) isn't female. In the same fashion, you k and you m may refer to different people, but they are constrained to denote addressees only.
Finally, let us observe that tense displays the same three properties that made us treat pronouns (whether third, second or first person) as sorted variables. (Partee, 1973) suggested that tenses behave in many respects as temporal pronouns (rather than as temporal operators, as was traditionally postulated in Tense Logic). In particular, she argued that the past tense can be used deictically, without any linguistic antecedent. For instance watching pictures of myself, I might say: I was young, meaning not the obvious truth that I was once young, but rather that I was young at the time made salient by the picture, i.e. when the pictures were taken 8 . By the same token, some farfetched cases of referential failure may be created when the wrong tense is selected. If I see a video of myself and say I was young even though (unbeknownst to me) the camera is filming me as I speak, the effect is not unlike that obtained when a feminine pronoun is used to refer to George W. Bush (in both cases one can understand what is meant, but the sentence is somehow deviant all the same). It is also uncontroversial that the past tense can be used as a bound variable, for instance in John was always late (universal quantification over past moments). Finally, both in the past and in the present there appear to be examples in which some tense marker is solely the result of morphological agreement and remains semantically uninterpreted: (13) Following the same reasoning as for (10) and (12), we note that the inference in (13)a (resp. (13)b) couldn't go through unless the variable t k ranged over past moments (resp. over the time of utterance); as a result the tense features must somehow remain uninterpreted in these cases as well.
(How the agreement is triggered is another issue -not one which is well understood. But see (Kratzer, 1998) and (Heim, 2002) for some remarks).
To recapitulate, pronouns and tenses form a natural class in that they behave very much as (multiply) sorted variables. Some of the sortal domains are relative to the Context of Utterance, which thus plays the role of a point of reference with respect to which the denotation of variables is situated.
Refinements
Before turning to a formal analysis of Free Indirect Discourse, I mention two respects in which the foregoing description is overly simplified.
As the description suggests, first person pronouns can figure in Free Indirect Discourse, and must denote the author of the Context of Utterance. (Doron, 1991) cites (14) But this is not the end of the story. There appears to be a further constraint on first person pronouns, which (Banfield, 1982) calls Priority of SPEAKER. Banfield's observation is that if the speaker of the Context of Utterance is mentioned (through the pronoun I), it must also be either the agent or the (17) I had become adept at reading my teachers' thoughts. My Greek teacher didn't like me so much after all. Really, I was a little devil, not entirely without talent, but impossible to deal withsomething had to be done about me, or else tomorrow I would become completely unbearable 10 . I conclude that Banfield's constraint is not quite correct as she states it, since in (17) the agent of the Context of Utterance is neither the author nor the intended addressee of the Context of Thought; and furthermore that the constraint should not be stipulated in the grammar of Free Indirect Discourse, but rather should be seen as a mere consequence of the pragmatics of narration.
Another difficult point concerns the interpretation of gender features. The present analysis might lead one to expect that gender features behave in the same way as person features and are thus read from the standpoint of the narrator rather than of the character whose thoughts are reported; that is, a feminine pronoun should be used just in case it refers to an individual that is in fact female in the world of the Context of Utterance u, even if the character thinks that that individual is female. In some cases the prediction appears to be borne out, although the judgments in (18) However these examples are rarely perfect, and are even quite degraded for some speakers (in French these examples tend to be more acceptable with weak than with strong pronouns).
10 While I have tested similar examples with a couple of French and English speakers, further work should be done to assess the data. Thus E. Doron (p.c.) disagrees with (16) and (17); she writes that the 'I' in them is unjustified, because 'if the protagonist isn't aware that the speaker is there, she certainly cannot use any pronoun to refer to him'.
(ii) Contrary to what is predicted by the present theory, but in accordance with the claims in (Doron, 1991) , it is sometimes the case that the gender features of a pronoun become part of the content of the thought which is reported (i.e. are read 'de dicto', so to speak), as in the following example, due to an anonymous reviewer:
(19) [Mary wrongly believed that Robin was male. In fact, Robin was a woman]
Where was he this morning, for instance? (Mary wondered)
In (19) he bears masculine features even though it denotes an individual that is female in the world of the context of utterance u. This appears to contradict the present theory, which would predict that she should be used instead. One possible line of analysis is that in this case the pronoun does not behave as a variable, but goes proxy for a definite description (e.g. 'the man') which, by definition, must be read De Dicto in Free Indirect Discourse. There is indeed independent motivation for positing that some pronouns may behave as definite descriptions. Thus in The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress (cited in (Levinson, 1983) , attributed to Karttunen), the pronoun it does not behave as a bound variable, but rather as a 'pronoun of laziness' which stands for the description his paycheck. Whether the problem we encountered with gender features can be handled in terms of pronouns of laziness is as yet unclear.
A Formal Analysis of Free Indirect Discourse

Basic Analysis
In order to provide an analysis of Free Indirect Discourse, we must clearly relativize the definition of denotation and truth to two contexts rather than one, and also -as is usual-to an assignment of values to variables. In what follows denotes s,u, q (resp. is true s, u, q ) means: denotes (resp. is true) under the assignment s, in the context of utterance u, and in the context of thought q.
The symbol # indicates referential failure in case the value given by an assignment to a variable does not satisfy its sortal restrictions; similarly a predicate is weird s,u, q has been added to indicate failure at the level of formulas. The lexical specifications of pronouns and tenses are given in (20), and those of other indexicals in (21):
(20) I k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't the speaker of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ). you k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't an addressee of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) she k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't (in the world of u) a female who is neither the speaker nor a addressee of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) he k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't (in the world of u) a male who is neither the speaker nor an addressee of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) pres k denotes s, u, q # iff s(t k ) isn't the time of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(t k ) past k denotes s, u, q # iff s(t k ) isn't before the time of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(t k ) (21) here denotes s, u, q the location of q now denotes s, u, q the time of q today denotes s, u, q the day of the time of q tomorrow denotes s, u, q the day that follows the time of q actually denotes s, u, q the world of q Several observations should be made at this point.
1. As was announced before and as can now be seen, Free Indirect Discourse can be analyzed without recourse to any modal operator. Thus even in the absence of the parenthetical 'John thought' the sentence can be understood and will be interpreted as a thought or claim attributed to John (because the Context of Thought is his), uttered through somebody else's mouth (the narrator's). 11 The technical point that is glossed over is the denotation of the l-term lt rich( he k , past t , actually) , which contains a variable with sortal restrictions past t. Following (Heim & Kratzer, 1998) , this term is taken to denote s, u, q the function f defined on moments by: f(t)=# iff t isn't before the time of u. Otherwise, f(t)=1 iff s(x k ) is rich at t. As a result, a failure (i.e. #) is obtained when the function is applied to a moment that isn't before the time of u.
In the truth-conditions proper (i.e. in the part of the last clause that follows (b) is true s, u, q iff __)
the Context of Utterance u does not play any role. This is a systematic fact which is discussed in Section 2.2.2.
3. From (22)a one may recover the very words that are attributed to John -in this case 'Now I am rich' is the likeliest possibility. The recoverability of a large part of the words that are attributed to the character in a passage in Free Indirect Discourse is also a systematic fact, which is discussed in Section 2.2.3.
Recovering the Thought and recovering the Words
Elimination of the context of utterance
As was said earlier, there is a sense in which the context of utterance does not contribute to the truth-conditions but only to the failure conditions of an utterance. This can be made precise by constructing for each sentence j a 'stripped' sentence j* obtained from j by replacing all multiply sorted individual and time variables by simply sorted ones and observing that if j does not result in referential failure, j has the same truth-conditions as j*: Then if j is not weird s, u, q , j is true s, u, q if and only if j* is true s, q From this it also follows that we may recover the thought expressed by a sentence that does not give rise to any failure by simply disregarding the contribution of the Context of Utterance.
Recovering the Context Set
So far we have given a procedure that determines the truth-conditions of a sentence in Free Indirect Discourse. We could also attempt to recover the thought attributed to the agent. Following Stalnaker's work (Stalnaker, 1999) we identify the thought expressed by a sentence S with the set of contexts that make S true. In simple cases this yields the correct result. If no referential failure occurs, the procedure outlined in (23) can be applied to eliminate the dependency on the context of utterance by 'stripping' the sentence of its person and tense features. Applied to (24) John is observing a scene through a mirror, as in (Kaplan, 1977 ) it could also have been of the form Now his pants are on fire, where -unbeknownst to John-his referred to John himself. But if the procedure outlined above were applied blindly to recover the agent's thought, all we could obtain would be the following: (Quine, 1956 ).
The problem was that in Quine's story it is both the case that Ralph believes, of Ortcutt (qua the man he saw in a brown hat), that he is a spy; and he also believes, of Ortcutt (qua the man he saw at the beach), that he is not a spy. Still, we don't want to conclude that Ralph thinks that Ortcutt is and is not a spy, which would make him irrational. Kaplan's solution was to assume that 'Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy' asserts that (i) Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under some description a (e.g.
'the man seen at the cocktail party'), and further that (ii) he would assent to: 
Ralph is acquainted with Ortcutt under some description a and believes:
È a is a spyT he same strategy can be applied to Free Indirect Discourse. However since we are claiming that a sentence in Free Indirect Discourse is not strictly speaking a report, but rather expresses a thought through someone else's mouth, we cannot follow Kaplan in claiming that the description is existentially quantified over. Rather, we must claim that the sentence in Free Indirect Discourse is ambiguous as to the descriptions that should replace the pronouns and tenses evaluated from the narrator's perspective. When the sentence (25)a is evaluated with respect to a context of thought q, a context of utterance u and an assignment s and does not lead to any referential failure, it can be taken to express -ambiguously-any thought of the form lq'[has-pants-on-fire(a, t m , actually) is true s, q' ], where a is some description (possibly an indexical one) under which the author of q is acquainted with s(x k ). Since John is certainly acquainted with himself under the description 'I', (25)a can thus express, among others, the thought T 1 (25), which corresponds to a direct discourse of the form My pants are on fire: Obviously the same treatment can be extended to the time variable as well, which will allow (25)a to express, among others, the thought T 2 (25)=lq'[the pants of the author of q' are on fire at the time of q' in the world of q'].
Recovering the sentence
Unlike a clause in standard indirect discourse, a sentence in Free Indirect Discourse provides information about the words that the character's thought was supposed to be expressed in. The only proviso concerns tenses and pronouns, which give rise to multiple ambiguities, as was shown in the preceding paragraph (to put it differently, the mapping between a Free Indirect Discourse and the strings of words -or the thought-attributed to the agent is one-to-many). We can apply the same Kaplanian procedure to recover the sentence as we did to recover the thought, by replacing tenses and pronouns with vivid names that have the same denotations. In this fashion His k pants were on fire evaluated with respect to s, u, q, can be taken to correspond to any sentence of the form a's pants be on fire at b, where a and b are respectively a vivid name of s(x k ) and a vivid name of s(t m ) for the agent of q. One possible correspondent is thus the sentence My pants are on fire, as is (ii) a is a name of x for Ralph desirable. (Note that once the sentence has been recovered in this fashion, the thought can also be recovered by a more direct method, i.e. by forming the set of all contexts that make the sentence true).
The Historical Present
Basic Facts
An interesting prediction can be derived from the theory developed so far. As we observed, in (iii) a is sufficiently vivid 13 A reviewer writes that, in her judgment, this sentence is 'not acceptable or, at best, a performance error'. Another reviewer, by contrast, gives the following discourse as acceptable: (i) Forty years ago today John Lennon is about to take to the stage at the Cavern. Tonight his life will change forever. The first sentence has exactly the same structure as (28)a, and makes the same point -an 'ago' indexical may co-occur with a present tense, contrary to the first reviewer's judgment. The second sentence raises problems of its own, since tonight is not evaluated with respect to the same Context of Thought as forty years ago. Any theory is presumably forced to posit that the Context of Thought was shifted between the first and the second sentence. I leave the issue of context shifts for future research.
c. #Fifty eight years ago to this day, on January 22, 1944, just as the Americans were about to invade Europe, the Germans attack Vercors.
Although in (28)a both occurrences of the present tense denotes a past moment, fifty eight years ago is still evaluated with respect to the actual speech act, which thus serves as the Context of Thought.
(Note that although the present tense could be replaced with a past tense, yielding a somewhat different literary effect, the replacement must be consistent and thus affect simultaneously both occurrences of the present tense morpheme; this explains the deviance of (28)c). As a result, the assertion is attributed to the actual speaker, as shown by the fact that the clause This turned out/will turn out to be false immediately transforms the discourse into a contradiction (by contrast, we saw before that in the case of Free Indirect Discourse a similar clause could be added, and contradicted only the character's, not the narrator's thought). The stylistic result is to present the scene in a particularly vivid way, as if the narrator were observing it directly. This can be explained by observing that the present tense is allowed to denote a past moment only because the narrator presents the Context of Utterance, which serves as the point of observation with respect to which the denotations of tenses and pronouns are classified, as having a time coordinate that lies in the past. In other words, by using the Historical Present the narrator presents the utterance as being made from a point that is simultaneous with the event described, and this accounts for the vividness of the description.
Let us consider things somewhat more formally. The framework developed above yields the following analysis (for simplicity I treat fifty-eight-years-ago, the-Germans and attack-Vercors as was not yet born in 1944, we must posit that u is an improper context, i.e. a context whose agent does not exist at the time of that context in the world of that context. How worrisome is this? I would argue that this result is just as it should be. The effect of (31) is precisely to give the impression that somehow the scene taking place on January 22 nd , 1944 is vividly present to the speaker's mind as if he were attending it. In other words, the literary effect obtained through (31) can arise precisely because the context of utterance is taken to be improper.
An alternative would be to posit that tense is somehow special, and that only it (unlike indexical pronouns) can be given a value different from a coordinate of the actual context. In the case at hand, however, this would appear to be too restrictive. For given the right set-up it does appear to be possible to create narrative situations in which the author of . As a result, the discourse is felicitous, although it requires one to take de Gaulle's perspective in describing the scene. This suggests -somewhat tentatively-that a first person pronoun may display the equivalent of the Historical Present, and be evaluated with respect to a
Context of Utterance whose speaker is not the actual one.
Conclusion
The facts However see ( Banfield, 1982) pp. 122ff for an alternative account of related facts, based on the 'echoic' use of certain assertions. 16 I have not explained, however, why the Context of Thought also fixes the reference of other indexicals, such as today, here or now. I leave this question for future research.
the Context of Utterance and the Context of Thought as being what they would be in a different context of thought and of utterance. In other words, the facts of Free Indirect Discourse and the Historical Present suggest that some instances of quotation should be analyzed, not as the mention of some words in the actual context, but as the use of those same words in a shifted context -or rather, in a pair of shifted contexts (see (Recanati, 2000) , Chapter 12 for other arguments in favor of the same conclusion).
Appendix: A Simple Logic with Two Context Parameters
® Definitions
Note: This is a minimal logic designed to illustrate the main claims of the paper. It could be enriched with individual and time quantifiers, as well as world variables and world quantifiers (as the system is set up the only world term is the indexical actually, which depends on the Context of Thought).
• Vocabulary and Syntax If i is an individual term, t is a time term and w is a world term, and if P and Q are predicates of type <0, 1, 1> and <1, 1, 1> respectively, P(t, w) and Q(i, t, w) are (atomic) formulas.
If j is a formula, i is an individual term and t and a time term, and if k is an integer, then:
ilx k j and tlt k j are formulas If j and y are formulas, then (j & y), (j v y) and ÿj are formulas Note: ilx k j and tlt k j are treated syncategorematically. In a more elaborate system lx k j and lt k j would be treated as complex predicates. An assignment function s is a function that assigns to each variable x k an individual and to each variable t k a moment. If x is a variable, we say that s' is a x-variant of s' if for each variable z different from x, s'(z)=s(z).
• Denotation Let k be any integer and s be an assignment function. Then: x k denotes s, u, q s(x k ) t k denotes s, u, q s(t k ) I k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't the speaker of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ). you k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't an addressee of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) he k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't a male who is neither the speaker nor a addressee of u at the time of u in the world of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) she k denotes s, u, q # iff s(x k ) isn't a female who is neither the speaker nor a addressee of u at the time of u in the world of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(x k ) pres k denotes s, u, q # iff s(t k ) isn't the time of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(t k ) past k denotes s, u, q # iff s(t k ) isn't before the time of u. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q s(t k ) now denotes s, u, q the time of q today denotes s, u, q the day of the time of q tomorrow denotes s, u, q the day that follows the time of q fifty-eight-years-ago denotes s, u, q the time which is exactly fifty-eight years before the time of q actually denotes s, u, q the world of q t's grandfather denotes s, u, q # iff t denotes s, u, q # or t does not denote s, u, q a human being. Otherwise it denotes s, u, q the most salient of t's grandfathers.
Note 1: we could avoid recourse to the notion of 'salience' in the definition of t's grandfather if the latter expression were replaced with t's paternal grandfather or t's maternal grandfather.
Note 2: In the present system each term has a denotation, which may be #. In what follows we write as t s,u,q the denotation of the term t under the assignment s in the Context of Utterance u, in the Context of Thought q.
• Truth -If j is an atomic formula P(t, w) (resp. Q(i, t, w)), j is weird s, u, q iff at least one of its arguments denotes s, u, q #. Otherwise it is true s, u, q iff <t s,u,q , w s,u,q > satisfies P (resp. <i s,u,q , t s,u,q , w s,u,q > satisfies
Q)
-If j is a formula tlxy, j is weird s, u, q iff y is weird s', u, q , where s' is a x-variant of s such that s'(x) is the denotation s, u, q of t. Otherwise j is true s, u, q iff y is true s', u, q -If j is a formula ÿy, j is weird s, u, q iff y is weird s, u, q . Otherwise j is true s, u, q iff y is not true s, u, q -If j is a formula (c & y) (resp. (c v y)), j is weird s, u, q iff c is weird s, u, q or y is weird s, u, q .
Otherwise j is true s, u, q iff c is true s, u, q and y is true s, u, q (resp. c is true s, u, q or y is true s, u, i ).
® Examples 
